In Strange Company: An American Soldier with Multinational Forces in the Middle East and Iraq

Colonel Tisos experience with operational planning and combat service with multinational forces in Iraq provides an exceptional background for this riveting, exciting, and most interesting book that superbly captures the challenges of Coalition Warfare. Lieutenant General (Retired) Joseph W. Kinzer, USA The decision to not deploy reoriented, trained Iraqi divisions and other allied forces in numbers significant enough to adequately stabilize the situation in Iraq in 200304 resulted in significant shortages of manpower and equipment that eventually led to a less-than-satisfactory ending to the campaign, and significantly challenged the entire Coalition effort in the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions assumed by allies were vitally important in the under-resourced effort to bring order to the chaos of Iraq but would remain relatively unheralded throughout most of the campaign. Colonel Tisos account of this time offers unique insights into the challenges of planning the Iraqi campaign and the intricacies and challenges of multinational service through the lens of his assignments as a war planner at U.S. Central Command, Senior Military Adviser of the Arab Peninsula Shield Force and the Polish-led Multinational Division (Central-South), and Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (C-3) of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team tasked to develop the New Iraqi Army. His observations cast significant light on the missions these units undertook and the challenges they confronted. His firsthand account of operational planning for war in Iraq captures the concerns of the military planners and senior commanders to liberate and stabilize the country, enabling the reader to better understand the challenges of operational war planning, coalition warfare, the difficulty of stabilizing Iraq after the fall of Baghdad, the development of the New Iraqi Army, and ultimately a deeper understanding of Americas long war in Iraq. Table of Contents Foreword Authors Notes and Acknowledgements Part I: Planning and Training for War 1 Multi-Cultural Experiences in Old New York 2 United States Central Command and the Central Region 3 Leading U.S. and Multinational Forces in the Sinai 4 Fighting the Force Protection Battle in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan 5 Planning the Inevitable War Part II: Operation Iraqi Freedom Special Missions 6 Staffing Post Hostilities Operations 7 Duty with the United Nations 8 Stability Operations in Iraq 9 Advising the Peninsula Shield Force 10 Reconnaissance of the Rumaylah Oil Fields 11 Redeployment of the Peninsula Shield Force 12 Assignment to the Coalition Military Assistance Team 13 Building the Foundation of an Army 14 Making the Most of Scant Resources 15 Recruiting, Organizing, and Training the New Iraqi Army Part III: Soldiering With the Multinational Division Central-South 16 Preparing for Duty with a Combat Division 17 Serving with the Multinational Division Central South 18 The Challenges of Multinational Command 19 The Power of the Theater Commander 20 Patrolling with the Ukrainians on the Iranian Border 21 Preparing the Occupation of Iraq 22 Indications of a Growing Insurgency in Central South Iraq 23 Dealing with Generals 24 The War Comes to the Multinational Division Central South 25 Defeating the Enemy with Overwhelming Force 26 Fighting the Battle for Central-South Iraq 27 Combat Action in Al Kut 28 The American Bureaucracy in Baghdad 29 Developing a Strategy to Conduct the Long War 30 False Hope For Peace in Iraq 31 Christmas on the Iranian Border 32 Terrorist Attack and Tragedy in Karbala 33 Transitioning to a New Commander and Division Staff 34 Teaching the New Command to Conduct Combat Operations 35 A New Liaison Team Arrives at Camp Babylon Part IV: Going Home: Reflections on the Long War 36 Going Home via Poland 37 Epilogue Endnotes